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The Use of ΚΕΚΛΗΜΑΙ, *and the Meaning of Euripides, Hippolytus 1-2.*

J. E. HARRY

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THE USE OF KEKAHMAI, AND THE MEANING OF EURIPIDES, HIPPOLYTUS 1–2.

A paper read before the American Philological Association at Union College, Schenectady, N. Y., July 9, 1902.

We Americans have been charged recently with expending a superfluity of energy on syntactical studies. Possibly the charge is well founded; but certainly any real contribution to our knowledge of the facts of the Greek language should be welcomed, not condemned. We want to get at the secrets of the masters of expression at almost any cost. To the tyro who seeks to establish and interpret the text of a Greek play probably nothing causes greater surprise than the diversity of opinion among scholars as to the meaning of certain passages. Editors differ not only from one another, but also from themselves; and the δεύτεραι φροντίδες are not always σοφώτεραι. Hermann contended for years against Welcker's theory of a Promethean trilogy, only to desert to the enemy at the last moment in a way that shows his heart may have been in the other camp for some time: "Communis opinio est de cuius veritate non videtur dubitandum esse, trilogiam fuisse."

Perceptions contradict,
Convictions come, anon depart,
And but themselves as false convict.
Assumptions, hasty, crude and vain,
Full oft to use will science deign.

As Lessings says, it matters not whose the false assumption is, if only by its aid we arrive at the truth.

There are four current interpretations of the first two verses of the *Hippolytus*. The primary aim of this paper is to show that three are false and the fourth but partly true. Two of these views, Ἡροδοτικῶς λέγων, I deem scarcely worthy of mention, εἰ μὴ ὅσον σημῆναι βουλόμενος μόνον: (1) that πολλὴ . . . κοὐκ ἀνώνυμος is equivalent to πολυώνυμος κοὐκ ἀνώνυμος and (2)—ἡ δ' ἑτέρη ἀνεπιστημονεστέρη μέν ἐστι τῆς λελεγμένης, λόγῳ δ' εἰπεῖν θαυμασιωτέρη —that κέκλημαι means *invocata sum*. The regular word for *invoke*, preserved even in Modern Greek is ἐπικαλεῖν. Cp. Bikelas, Λουκῆς Λάρας, 11 ἐπικαλοῦμαι τὴν σύμπραξιν του, ἐπικαλέσθην τὴν βοήθειαν τοῦ Θεοῦ, Hdt. 3.65 θεοὺς τοὺς βασιληίους ἐπικαλέων, 8.64 Τελαμῶνα ἐπεκαλέοντο. That the simple verb may be used for the compound is patent: τοὺς θεοὺς καλούμεθα (Aesch. *Cho.* 201).

But the third theory, since it is held by some of our best scholars, seems to demand more serious attention, and, like the opinion of Herodotus with reference to the cause of the overflow of the Nile, can be shown to be incorrect only by an exploration of the sources, not by guessing, but by securing trustworthy data. The supporters of this view conceive that there is a twist in the sentence, that Euripides did not proceed, as usual, straight to the goal, but, like the mules of Achilles, πολλὰ δ' ἄναντα κάταντα πάραντα τε δόχμιά τ' ἦλθον—in short, that we have not here, in the very opening of a masterpiece, the well-known *rotunda volubisque sententia* of Euripides, but a disjointed Browningesque utterance, peculiar in punctuation, peculiar in elucidation.* I shall waive the consideration that εὖηθες τοῦτό γε φανείη ἂν καὶ οὐκ Εὐριπίδου ("past dispute the verse slips oily-bathed in unctuous music"), since there are weightier reasons for believing that no such volcanic disturbance of the smooth surface of the

*Cp. Ar. *Rhet.* 3. 5. 6 ὅλως δὲ δεῖ εὐανάγνωστον εἶναι τὸ γεγραμμένον καὶ εὔφραστον, οὐδὲ ἃ μὴ ῥᾴδιον διαστίξαι ὥσπερ τὰ Ἡρακλείτου· τὰ γὰρ Ἡρακλείτου διαστίξαι ἔργον διὰ τὸ ἄδηλον εἶναι ποτέρῳ πρόσκειται, τῷ ὕστερον ἢ τῷ πρότερον· The Euripidean order of words reproduces the natural sequence of ideas.

Euripidean current, as Weil and Earle* suppose, exists, and if my contentions are correct, we can say with Herodotus again: ἡ δὲ τρίτη τῶν ὁδῶν πολλὸν ἐπιεικεστάτη ἐοῦσα, μάλιστα ἔψευσται.

In the first place, the poet's object is not to inform his audience how *renowned* the θεά is, but *who* she is (since this is the first question that the observer naturally asks himself), just as in vase paintings of the archaic type the goddess is labelled ΑΦΡΟΔΙΤΗ for the information of the beholder. So the beginning of *Hercules Furens*: Τίς τὸν Διὸς σύλλεκτρον οὐκ οἶδεν βροτῶν | Ἄρειον Ἀμφιτρύων' ὃν Ἀλκαῖός ποτε | ἔτιχθ' ὁ Περσέως, πατέρα τόνδ' Ἡρακλέους; which von Wilamowitz well translates: "Wer kennt ihn nicht, der seines weibes liebe mit Zeus geteilt, Amphitryon von Argos, Alkaios des Persiden Sohn, den Vater des Herakles? ich bins." So the opening of the *Hecuba*: Ἥκω νεκρῶν κευθμῶνα καὶ σκότου πύλας λιπὼν . . . Πολύδωρος, Ἑκάβης παῖς γεγώς, and of *Troades*: Ἥκω λιπὼν Αἰγαιον ἁλμυρὸν βάθος | πόντου Ποσειδῶν. Similarly Hermes in *Ion* tells who he is by naming first his mother and grandfather, then himself and his office, and finally his errand, as in many Euripidean prologues. Compare *Andromache* (ἀφικόμην . . . Ἀνδρομάχη) and *Bacchæ* (Ἥκω Διὸς παῖς . . . Διόνυσος)†. In *Helena*, after an explanatory introduction of twenty-one verses, the speaker tells who she was (Ἑλένη ἐκλήθην. Cp. Ar. *Thesm.* 862), using the same verb as Kypris in *Hippolytus*. In *Iphigenia in Tauris* the whole line of Pelops is traced: Πέλοψ . . . Οἰνομάου γαμεῖ κόρην, ἐξ ἧς Ἀτρεὺς ἔβλαστεν· Ἀτρέως δὲ παῖς | Μενέλαος Ἀγαμέμνων τε· τοῦ δ' ἔφυν ἐγώ. So in *Orestes* 5–23: Ζεύς . . . Τάνταλος . . . Πέλοψ . . . Ἀτρεὺς . . . Ἀγαμέμνων . . . ᾧ παρθένοι μὲν τρεῖς ἔφυμεν ἐκ μιᾶς Χρυσόθεμις Ἰφιγένεια τ' Ἠλέκτρά τ' ἐγώ.

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*The chief supporters of the theory. Mahaffy and Bury merely echo the French scholar. Von Wilamowitz gives the sense (In himmel und auf erden kennt man mich und meiner gottheit wirken Aphrodites), but does not commit himself by his translation to either Weil's or Earle's explanation.

†Cp. Ar. *Rhet.* 3. 14. 6. καὶ οἱ τραγικοὶ δηλοῦσι περὶ τὸ δρᾶμα, κἂν μὴ εὐθὺς ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης, αλλ' ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ γέ που.

In each instance the purpose of the speaker is to acquaint the audience with his identity. But the most instructive of all for our passage is the prologue of the *Phœnissæ*: Κάδμος . . . ὃς Πολύδωρον ἐξέφυσε, τοῦ δὲ Λάβδακον φῦναι λέγουσιν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦδε Λάιον. | ἐγὼ δὲ παῖς μὲν κληίζομαι Μενοικέως, | Κρέων τ' ἀδελφὸς μητρὸς ἐκ μιᾶς ἔφυ· | καλοῦσι δ' Ἰοκάστην με, τοῦτο γὰρ πατὴρ | ἔθετο (5–13). The positive statement is made that Ἰοκάστη is her name, not φύσει, but θέσει (πατὴρ ἔθετο). We are in an atmosphere of θέσεις. She is *reputed* to be the daughter of Menoiceus (φῦναι λέγουσιν). Hence we are not suprised to find καλοῦσι Ἰοκάστην με, instead of κέκλημαι Ἰοκάστη.

In the second place, if πολλὴ κέκλημαι be understood as equivalent to μέγα ἔχω τὸ ὄνομα (Earle), or πολύ μοι κλέος ἐστίν (Weil), οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕνα λόγον φαίνεται ἐμβεβλῆσθαι τὸ μέν, and, as Aristotle says (*Rhet.* 3. 5. 2.) ὁ μέν καὶ ὁ ἐγὼ μέν ἀπαιτεῖ τὸν δέ καὶ τὸν ὁ δέ. Not to speak of the pointlessness of the utterance in the bare form: "I am renowned and not without renown", the assertion does not balance properly with δείξω δὲ μύθων τῶνδ' ἀλήθειαν τάχα (9), nor, indeed, with the rest of the prologue, which is but an explanation and amplification of this statement. It is the *power* of the goddess that is to be manifested in the following story (cp. 21, 23, 33, 39, 44, 48f., 56f.), and for this very reason πολλή is made prominent by its position, is put first because it is the keynote to the whole play. The chord which sounds the note of πολλή is struck at every step, and at the end, when Aphrodite has manifested her terrible power, the chorus hastens to recognize and exalt it in an ode, the beginning of which bears a striking resemblance to what the goddess says of herself in the first two verses: σὺ τὰν θεῶν ἄκαμπτον φρένα καὶ βροτῶν ἄγεις, Κύπρι. Hence the appropriateness, in the very beginning, of πολλή. Aphrodite's power is so great that it *fills* the universe. As the nurse says (447ff.), φοιτᾷ δ' ἀν' αἰθέρ', ἔστι δ' ἐν θαλασσίῳ | κλύδωνι Κύπρις, πάντα δ' ἐκ ταύτης ἔφυ· | ἥδ' ἐστὶν ἡ σπείρουσα καὶ διδοῦσ' ἔρον, | οὗ πάντες ἐσμὲν οἱ κατὰ χθόν' ἔκγονοι. Cp. Soph. *Tr.* 497 μέγα τι σθένος ἁ Κύπρις ἐκφέρεται νίκας ἀεί.

Now this power which Aphrodite proposes to display is precisely what a scholiast says πολλή means, for he explains by δυνατή, which is, again, precisely its force in the same play and used of the same deity (443): Κύπρις γὰρ οὐ φορητός, ἣν πολλὴ ῥυῇ. Indeed, there seems to be only a semi-personification of the goddess in the poet's mind, as he writes the first word of the tragedy. The idea of flow is so often associated with Κύπρις (almost always when used with πολλή. Cp. Hor. *Od.* 1. 19. 9. *in me tota ruens Venus*), as in 401 and 443, that probably the word for the "influence" of the deity which Euripides had in mind had not lost its original meaning so completely as the corresponding English word. The image of a mighty river flowing deep and full (πολ–) may have been at the basis of the expression. Compare *Bacchæ* 281 ὅταν πλησθῶσιν ἀμπέλου ῥοῆς with 300 ὅταν γὰρ ὁ θεὸς εἰς τὸ σῶμ' ἔλθῃ πολύς. At all events, the frequency of the phrase Κύπρις πολλή does not seem to justify the complete dissociation of the two words here, particularly when the combination πολλή—κέκλημαι creates a sentence that is universally recognized as harsh. When Euripides sneers at Aeschylus (Ar. *Ran.* 1046) for not having Aphrodite in his plays, for being a *homo invenustus*, the latter retorts ἀλλ' ἐπὶ σοί τοι καὶ τοῖς σοῖσιν πολλή πολλοῦ 'πικαθῆτο. Moreover, the phrase ἐν βροτοῖσι, coming, as it does, immediately after πολλή, makes the meaning I have assigned to the word natural and easy. οὐρανοῦ τ' ἔσω is an afterthought (*and so it is in heaven*). Cp. Eur. *H. F.* 849 ἀνὴρ ὅδ' οὐκ ἄσημος οὔτ' ἐπὶ χθονὶ | οὔτ' ἐν θεοῖσιν. Differently from the many persons and things in the *Iliad* which bear different names ἐν βροτοῖσι καὶ ἐν οὐρανῷ, Κύπρις is Κύπρις in both places. Furthermore, the position of ἐν βροτοῖσι with reference to ἀνώνυμος and πολλή lends color to the theory that *both* adjectives must be taken with Κύπρις. Cp. also *Bacchæ* 273 οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην μέγεθος ἐξειπεῖν ὅσος | καθ' Ἑλλάδ' ἔσται. It was the power of the reified Kypris which Phaedra was unable to cope with successfully (401): οὐκ ἐξήνυτον κύπρις κρατῆσαι. The chorus prays

that Kypris may never come ἄρρυθμος (*in undue measure*), which is practically the same as πολλή. "Love's keen arrows" are ὑπέρτερον, that is, κρεῖττον than all others (530ff.). The walls of Thebes and the Dircean fount could tell of the power of Kypris (557): ἁ Κύπρις οἷον ἔρπει. Hippolytus himself finally recognizes her might (725): Κύπριν, ἥπερ ἐξόλλυσί με. The last song the chorus sings has for its burden the omnipotence of Aphrodite, who subdues the wild beasts of the forest, the creatures that live in the sea, everything that breathes in the light of the sun, yea, even men (127ff.): συμπάντων δὲ βασιληίδα τιμάν, Κύπρι, τῶνδε μόνα κρατύνεις. Sophocles in no less extravagant terms tells of her overpowering might (*Fr.* 890): τὴν Ἀφροδίτην οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὅση θεός, | ἣν οὐδ' ἂν εἴποις οὐδὲ μετρήσειας ἂν | ὅση πέφυκε κἀφ' ὅσον διέρχεται . . . . . ἔργῳ δὲ δείξω τὸ σθένος τῆς θεοῦ (cp. verse 9 of the *Hippolytus*), and again in his *Phædra*: καὶ τόνδ' (Eros) ἀπείργειν οὐδ' ὁ παγκρατὴς σθένει Ζεὺς ἀλλ' ὑπείκει, while the nurse in Euripides' play, when she hears the secret of Phædra's love, exclaims (355ff.): Κύπρις οὐκ ἄρ' ἦν θεός, ἀλλ' εἴ τι μεῖζον ἄλλο γίγνεται θεοῦ. Cp. *Bacch.* 777 Διόνυσος ἥσσων οὐδενὸς θεῶν ἔφυ. The scholiast gives also μεγίστη, θαυμαστή as equivalents of πολλή in the first verse of the *Hippolytus*. But the objection may be raised that πολλή cannot mean μεγάλη. It is not a far cry from πολλὴ γῆ to πολλὴ κραυγή (Xen. *An.* 3. 4. 45), nor from the latter to πολλὴ θεά. The two words are neighbors and encroach on each other's domain. Sometimes the meanings seem to merge. Sophocles says μέγας χρόνος (*Ai.* 714) as well as πολὺς χρόνος. Herodotus writes πλοῦτον μέγαν (2. 121) and χρημάτων μεγάλων (5. 6). Cp. Aesch. *Pers.* 163. Nauck wishes to change λόγος μέγας, the manuscript reading of *Prometheus* 732, to λόγος πολύς. The scholiast remarks on this passage: γενήσεσθαι δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μεγάλη φήμη τῆς σῆς πορείας. Compare Soph. *Ai.* 173 ὦ μεγάλη φήμη, 226 ὁ μέγας μῦθος, *Ant.* 855 (πολύ = *violently*). In *Persæ* 250 we read πολὺς πλούτου λιμήν, where some would change (unnecessarily) to conform to the same phrase in

Euripides (*Orestes* 1077), who doubtless borrowed it from Aeschylus. The repetition with ὄλβος just below is after the poet's manner (748, 780, Cp. *Ag.* 641.). In *Persae* 751 we read πολὺς πλούτου πόνος, in *Suppl.* 294 φάτις πολλή, in *Eum.* 646 πολλὴ μηχανή, in Eur. *Suppl.* 474 πολὺς κλύδων, Plato, *Phaedr.* 253 D σκολιὸς πολύς. But long before Euripides was πολύς used in this sense, *e. g.* H, 157 πολλὸς γάρ τις ἔκειτο. In Byzantine Greek πολύς was used regularly for μέγας. An even more interesting fact is that this use survives in Greece to-day, as Bikelas, Λουκῆς Λάρας, 7 αὐτὸς ἦτον ὁ ἀρχιγραμματεὺς τῆς ἐπικρατείας, ὁ μέγας καὶ πολὺς Θεόδωρος Νέγρης. From Homer to the present day πολύς in the senses of μέγας has lived on as one of the elements of the undying language. The scholiast says that πολλή here is equivalent to δυνατή, and Plato's definition of this adjective is: Δυνατὸς δέ γ' ἐστὶν ἕκαστος ἄρα, ὃς ἂν ποιῇ τότε ὃ ἂν βούληται, ὅταν βούληται. The idea is not that Aphrodite εἶχε μέγα τὸ ὄνομα ἐν βροτοῖσι, but ἐδύνατο μέγα ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησιν (Plato, *Meno* 94D). It is the Sophoclean "how-much-ness" of the goddess (*Fr.* 890) that Euripides has in mind. Kypris *could*, and she *would*: Κύπρις ἤθελ' ὥστε γίγνεσθαι τάδε (1327),—ὁρᾷς τὴν θεῶν ἰσχὺν ὅση (Soph. *Ai.* 118), ἄρχει καὶ θεῶν ὅπως θέλει (*Tr.* 442). That πολύς can be used in this sense is attested by a passage in a play written only a few years after the *Hippolytus*: οὕτω δ' ἰσχνέ τε καὶ μέγας ἦν τότε καὶ πολύς, ὥστ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν | ἀπὸ τῆς ῥώμης τῆς τότ' ἐκείνης κτέ. (Ar. *Av.* 488f.). Cp. *Eq.* 760 πρὸς ταῦθ' ὅπως ἕξει πολὺς καὶ λαμπρὸς ἐς τὸν ἄνδρα. Though the adjective is probably not in the predicate in the passage under discussion (see below), the verses just quoted from Aristophanes show that it can be so employed even in the singular (meaning δυνατός, *mighty*, *gewaltig*), notwithstanding the expressed opinion of some of our best scholars to the contrary. In Hdt. I. 120 we find the superlative in the singular used as a predicate (ταύτῃ πλεῖστος τῇ γνώμῃ εἰμί).

But a philologian must be a veritable Cebes, καρτερώτατος πρὸς τὸ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις, and if it be urged that the deity's power can be argued from her renown, more convincing argument remain,—δεῖ γὰρ καὶ τὸν Κέβητα πείθειν.

If πολλή had come in the second verse and κέκλημαι Κύπρις been placed in the first, nobody would ever have thought of taking the phrase in any other sense than *ich heisse*, *je m' nomme*, *Kypris*. Earle says (PAPA, 1901, p. XXIX) that the harsh order of the words has led many to misunderstand them, and adds "the verses are of course to be understood as equivalent to πολλὴ μὲν ἐν βροτοῖσιν οὐρανοῦ τ' ἔσω κέκλημαι θεὰ Κύπρις (πολλὴ κέκλημαι = μέγα ἔχω τὸ ὄνομα) κοὐκ ἀνώνυμος <εἰμι>. But κέκλημαι with πολλή and κέκλημαι with Κύπρις are two different verbs. We might say πολύ μοι κλέος ἐστίν, but not Κύπρις μοι κλέος ἐστίν. If, however, θεὰ Κύπρις be considered appositive (instead of predicative) a Greek would expect some indication of the fact, such as the insertion of ἐγώ, particularly as both the meaning and the position of κέκλημαι would, in that case, be unusual, to say nothing of the adjectival form of πολλή. Moreover, Earle does violence to the order by separating Κύπρις from κέκλημαι by θεά, and he makes the change with the express purpose of bringing κέκλημαι into closer relation with πολλή. The sequence κέκλημαι Κύπρις is the intentional and intended order of Euripides.

The so-called perfect κέκλημαι is not used of the transitory, but of the fixed, the permanent, whereas the tendency is to employ the present to designate the fleeting, that which is for the time being, the name θέσει, not φύσει. "Alles vergaengliche ist nur ein Gleichnis" (the present), whereas "das Ewig-weibliche" is expressed by the perfect (κέκλημαι), the kyprisity of Kupris, the cupidity of Cupid. The character of the person inheres in the name, As the chorus in the *Agamemnon* says (681ff.): τίς ποτ' ὠνόμαζεν ὧδ' ἐς τὸ πᾶν ἐτητύμως . . . τὰν δορίγαμβρον ἀμφινεικῆ θ' Ἑλέναν; ἐπεὶ

πρεπόντως | ἐλέναυς, ἐλέπολις κτέ. Cp. Soph. *Ai.* 430 αἰαῖ · τίς ἄν ποτ' ᾠεθ' ὧδ' ἐπώνυμον | τοὐμὸν ξυνοίσειν ὄνομα τοῖς ἐμοῖς κακοῖς.*

It is significant that the perfect active κέκληκα barely emerges in Greek literature (twice in Aristophanes, Plato and Demosthenes). The explanation is that κέκλημαι was je m' appelle, whereas j' appelle was καλῶ and *j' ai appellé* ἐκάλεσα, just as ἐκτησάμην is both aorist and perfect. In the *Republic* 580 E we have an example of Platonic ποικιλία (κεκλήκαμεν for ἐκαλέσαμεν). In all but one of the examples in Demosthenes the verb is the regular perfect of καλεῖν (advocare). The perfect passive in this sense is extremely rare (κεκλῆσθαι ἐς δαῖτα). In all of these passages the ordinary meaning of κέκλημαι is ignored and κέκληκα is used as the perfect of καλῶ (instead of the normal ἐκάλεσα), ἐπ' ἄριστον, ἐπὶ δεῖπνον καλεῖν being common phrases. So the pluperfect ἐκεκλήμην (Lucian, *Somnium* 9). Cp. Ar. *Av.* 1602, *Ran.* 395, Athenaeus 10, 457 B.

But κέκλημαι occurs over a hundred times, and regularly in the sense of *ich heisse*, *je me nomme*, *io mi chiamo*.

E donna mi chiamò beata e bella.
Dante, *Inferno*, 2.53.

The tense alone is fatal to the Weil-Earle theory. Not the perfect, but the present would, under normal conditions,

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*In the heroic age names were born of a custom: hence the imperfect ὠνόμαζεν in the passage just quoted. Hector's son was Skamandrios or Astyanax. Cp. Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1. 11. 3 ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν φύσις τοῦ αεί, τὸ δὲ ἔθος τοῦ πολλάκις, Plato, *Crat.* 383A ὀνόματος ὀρθότητα εἶναι ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων φύσει πεφυκυῖαν καὶ οὐ τοῦτο εἶναι ὄνομα ὃ ἄν τινες ξυνθέμενοι καλεῖν καλῶσι, τῆς αὑτῶν φωνῆς μόριον ἐπιφθεγγόμενοι, ἀλλὰ ὀρθότητά τινα τῶν ὀνομάτων πεφυκέναι καὶ Ἕλλησι καὶ βαρβάροις τὴν αὐτὴν ἅπασιν. In other words ὄνομα διδασκαλικόν τί ἐστιν ὄργανον (388B). To the Greek there was such a thing as a κύριον καὶ οἰκεῖον ὄνομα (Ar. *Rhet.* 3. 6). Cp. Cicero, *Or.* 3. 37. 149 quae propria sunt, et certa quasi vocabulum rerum, paene una nata cum rebus ipsis. From these are distinguished words quae transferuntur et quasi alieno in loco collocantur: aut iis quae novamus et facimus ipsi, *Pro Caecina* 18.51 res ut omnes suis certis ac propriis vocabulis nominentur, Plato, *Crat.* 391E δῆλον γὰρ δὴ ὅτι οἵ γε θεοὶ αὐτὰ καλοῦσιν προς ὀρθότητα ἅπερ ἐστὶ φύσει ὀνόματα.

be required, as for example, in the opening verses of the *Persae*. An exact parallel to πολλὴ κέκλημαι cannot be found. The common adjective is not used as often in the predicate with καλεῖσθαι as are other forms, and when it *is* employed, the meaning is different from that which Weil and Earle wish to assign to πολλὴ κέκλημαι. Cp. Plato, *Crat.* 194 D σοφοὶ . . . καλοῦνται, Ar. *Rhet.* 2. 24. 2 μόνος γὰρ καλεῖται κοινὸς Ἑρμῆς, Phocylides, (Γνῶμαι) ἄφρων κικλήσκεται ἐν πολίταις.*

HOMER.

The first example of κεκλῆσθαι appears in the second book of the Iliad: μηδ' ἔτι Τηλεμάχοιο πατὴρ κεκλημένος εἴην (260). The remainder are Δ 61 σὴ παράκοιτις κέκλημαι, Λ 758 κολώνη κέκληται, Σ 365 (=B 61). The perfect does not appear in the Odyssey. The present, on the other hand, is very common, and is regularly used of the temporary, or local, of that which is so named at certain times, in certain places, by certain persons, or under certain conditions: A 293 ἦ γάρ κεν δειλός τε καὶ οὐτιδανὸς καλεοίμην, 403 ὃν Βριάρεων καλέουσι θεοί, ε 306 κοτύλην δέ μιν καλέουσιν, ζ 402 τὸν ῥ' Ἕκτωρ καλέεσκε Σκαμάνδριον, ι 461 ὡς μὴ πατροφόνος καλεοίμην, ξ 210 αἰεί κέ σφι φίλη τε καὶ αἰδοίη καλεοίμην, 279 οἳ Τιτῆνες καλέονται, 291 χαλκίδα κικλήσκουσι θεοί, υ 74 ὃν Ξάνθον καλέουσι θεοί, ξ 29 ὅν τε κύν' Ὠρίωνος ἐπίκλησιν καλέουσιν, 506 Ἀστυάναξ, ὃν Τρῶες ἐπίκλησιν καλέουσιν, δ 355 Φάρον δέ ἑ κικλήσκουσιν, ε 275 ἅμαξαν ἐπίκλησιν καλέουσιν, ν 104, 348 αἱ νηιάδες καλέονται, η 313, ξ 147 μιν ἠθεῖον καλέω, ο 403 νῆσός τις Συρίη κικλήσκεται, 433, ρ 423, τ 79 ἀφνειοὶ καλέονται, ι 366 Οὖτιν δέ με κικλήσκουσιν, κ 305 μῶλυ δέ μιν καλέουσι θεοί, μ 61 Πλαγκτὰς . . . θεοὶ μάκαρες καλέουσιν, σ 6 ἶρον δὲ νέοι κίκλησκον ἅπαντες (not his real name, for Ἀρναῖος δ' ὄνομ' ἔσκε· τὸ γὰρ θέτο πότνια μήτηρ | ἐκ γενετῆς).

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*Of the numerous Greek expressions for *nomen est, nominari, dici*, κεκλῆσθαι is one of the commonest: Hesiod, *Theog.* 144 ὄνομ' ἐπώνυμον, Ar. *Pax* 520 προσείπω σ' ἔπος, *Av.* 814 ὄνομα καλῶμεν, 923 τοὔνομ' ἐθέμην, Plato, *Crat.* 156 B ἔχουσιν ὀνόματα, Herodotus 2.52 ὄνομα κεκτέαται, 4.45 ὄνομα ἔλαβε.

The first appearance of καλεῖν in Greek literature is in A 54 καλέσατο λαόν. So a dozen times in Homer in the middle, the compound προκαλεῖν not so often and συγκαλεῖν only two or three times. The active of καλεῖν in the sense of *advocare* is found fifty times, the middle very seldom.

HESIOD.

The form κεκλῆσθαι appears in Hesiod but once (*Theog.* 410 φιλὴν κεκλῆσθαι ἄκοιτιν) the present passive three times (*O. D.* 141 τοὶ μὲν ὑποχθόνιοι μάκαρες θνητοὶ καλέονται), the active twice, κικλήσκειν twice, and καλέεσκεν once (*Theog.* 207). Cp. *O. D.* 80 ὀνόμηνε δὲ τήνδε γυναῖκα | Πανδώρην.

THE LYRIC POETS.

The first example of κεκλῆσθαι is in Archilochus, and this in the future: ἐπίκουρος κεκλήσομαι (24).* The second instance is in an epigram of Acarnania (τόδε σᾶμα κεκλήσεται). Two similar examples are quoted as from Theognis. The only examples of the perfect are in Hybrias (Τούτῳ δεσπότας μνοίας κέκλημαι) and Pindar, *O.* 7.76 (κέκληνται δέ σφιν ἕδραι). The active is found in Erinna 5. 6, Philoxenus 1.66, Simonides 12. 31, Pindar *P.* 9.71, *Thren.* 4. There are three examples of the passive present in Simonides and one in the Anacreonteia. In the sense of *advocare* Alcaeus and Sappho each have one, Pindar four.

THE DRAMATIC POETS.

In Aeschylus κέκλημαι occurs eight times: *Sept.* 929 τεκνογόνοι κέκληνται, *Eum.* 417 Ἀραὶ κεκλήμεθα, *Pers.* 242 δοῦλοι κέκληνται, *Cho.* 321 χάριτες κέκληνται, *Ag.* 161 εἰ τόδ' αὐτῷ φίλον κεκλημένῳ, *Cho.* 1037 φέγγος κεκλημένον, *Eum.* 658 κεκλημένου τέκνου. The future appears three times, twice in the *Prometheus*: 734 Βόσπορος δ' ἐπώνυμος κεκλήσεται, 840 πόντιος μυχὸς . . . κεκλήσεται, once in the *Septem.* (698) κακὸς οὐ κεκλήσει. καλεῖν occurs

* The future perfect, being a perfect thrown into the future, becomes a future when the perfect is used as a present.

twenty-two times in the sense of *advocare*, six times in the sense of *nominare*.

Sophocles has five examples of κεκλῆσθαι: *El.* 366 πατρὸς πάντων ἀρίστου παῖδα κεκλῆσθαι, 1087 σοφά τ' ἀρίστα τε παῖς κεκλῆσθαι, *Tr.* 736 ἄλλου κεκλῆσθαι μητέρα, *Phil.* 85 κέκλησο, 119 σοφός τ' ἂν αὐτὸς κἀγαθὸς κεκλῇ ἅμα. The fnture of κέκλημαι occurs twice: *O. T.* 522 κακὸς δὲ πρὸς σοῦ καὶ φίλων κεκλήσομαι, *Ai.* 1338 οὐκ ἐμὸν κεκλήσεται. In *Electra* 971 appears the future middle καλεῖ, the only instance of its use in a passive sense. Aristophanes employs the form, but regularly as a middle, contrary to the rule with other verbs. The present and future middle and passive of καλεῖν are identical in Attic; hence the future of κεκλῆσθαι had to do service for the future also of καλεῖσθαι. The regular future passive of καλῶ is κεκλήσομαι (rarely κληθήσομαι); consequently the so-called future perfect is often found where the principles I have enounced for the present and perfect would not seem to warrant the use of this form. It is merely a make-shift, κεκλήσομαι for καλοῦμαι (which would be ambiguous). On the other hand, where the present is used the meaning is regularly "called for the nonce": *El.* 1194 μήτηρ καλεῖται, μητρὶ δ' οὐδὲν ἐξισοῖ (a mother in name merely), *O. T.* 8 ὁ πᾶσι κλεινὸς Οἰδίπους καλούμενος, *O. C.* 57 χθονὸς καλεῖται τῆσδε χαλκόπους ὁδός, 107 μεγίστης Παλλάδος καλούμεναι πασῶν Ἀθῆναι τιμιωτάτη πόλις, 1303 ὅσοιπερ Ἀπίας | πρῶτοι καλοῦνται καὶ τετίμηνται δορί, where the present denotes the local, transient name, and the perfect expresses fixed repute. Cp. *Thuc.* 2.45 τετίμηνται (*permanent honor*), *Phil.* 94 προδότης καλεῖσθαι. Of course the permanent may be regarded as for the time being, the transitory as the abiding. So in *O. C.* 69 we find Θησεὺς καλεῖται τοῦ πρὶν Αἰγέως τόκος, which would seem to be as much the hero's fixed name as Kypris is Aphrodite's, but Oedipus is told by the stranger what the people call the king so that he too may name him correctly; not the *person*, but the *name* is emphasized, whereas in the *Hippolytus* it is the *person* on

which the stress is laid. Cp. *Thuc.* 5. 9. 9 Λακεδαιμονίων ξυμμάχοις κεκλῆσθαι (allies in reality, not in name only). The present optative occurs once: γυναικῶν ἥσσονες καλοίμεθ' ἄν (*Ant.* 680). The middle, which is rare in Attic, except as a law term (to cite before court) is found in *O. C.* 1385 (ἀρὰς ἅς σοι καλοῦμαι).

In Euripides κεκλῆσθαι is very common (22 examples) and always means "to be cleped". Now just as κεκλημένος can never mean κλεινός, or κλέος ἔχων, so κέκλημαι cannot signify πολύ μοι κλέος ἐστίν, either with πολλή or without it; (far different is ἐγὼ δ' ἐν πᾶσι θεοῖσιν μήτι τε κλέομαι καὶ κέρδεσιν ν 298) and even if we wrench κέκλημαι from Κύπρις (which to the Greek, and particularly to Euripides, would have been an impossibility) πολλὴ κέκλημαι would naturally mean "I am πολλὴ ycleped", something very different from πολύ, πολλά, πολλάκις ycleped".*

The examples in Euripides are: *Hec.* 480 κέκλημαι δούλα, 552 δούλη κεκλῆσθαι, *Fr.* 22 σοφὴ κέκλημαι, *Hel.* 1463, *Ion.* 311 Λοξίου κεκλήμεθα, *H. F.* 501, *El.* 366 κέκληνται πόσις ἐμός, *Hec.* 625 τίμιος κεκλημένος, *Androm.* 75 ὁ κεκλημένος πατήρ, *Rhes.* 298, *H. F.* 31, 291, *Suppl.* 626, *I. T.* 570, *Alc.* 637 κεκλημένη μήτηρ, *Ion* 9 πόλις . . . Παλλάδος κεκλημένη, *Fr.* 2 κεκλῆσθαι βούλεται πατήρ, 8 δειλὸν κεκλῆσθαι (*branded a coward*), 150 κέκληται θανεῖν ("the thing mortals call death", Byron, *Manfred* 2.2), 8 ἐμὸς γαμβρὸς κέκλησαι, *Fr. incert.* κεκλῆσθαι κακόν. The future passive κληθήσεται occurs once (*Tro.* 13), κεκλήσομαι ten times: *Hec.* 1271, *Alc.* 331, ἐμὴ γύνη μόνη κεκλήσῃ, *I. A.* 954, *Hel.* 1035 οὔποτε κεκλήσῃ δυσσεβής, 1683 θεὸς κεκλήσῃ, *Ion.* 580, 594, *El.* 1275 ἐπώνυμός σου πόλις κεκλήσεται, *Fr.* 12, *Fr. incert.* σεμνὸς Παλαίμων ναυτίλοις κεκλήσεται.

In Aristophanes there are only three examples of κέκλημαι, and these are all in the future: *Vesp.* 151 ὅστις πατρὸς νῦν Καπνί-

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*Cp. Thucydides 3.82.7 δεξιοὶ κέκληνται (*have a reputation for cleverness*). That the adjective might be used for the adverb is, of course, not denied.

ου κεκλήσομαι, *Av.* 184 κεκλήσεται πόλις (Cp. 182, where the present is used, καλεῖται νῦν πόλος), 761 ἀτταγᾶς οὗτος παρ' ἡμῖν ποικίλος κεκλήσεται. Of the present there are twenty-five examples: *Vesp.* 1137 οἱ μὲν καλοῦσ' Περσίδ', οἱ δὲ καννάκην, *Av.* 485 καλεῖται Περσικὸς ὄρνις 720 πτερμόν τ' ὄρνιθα καλεῖτε. There are forty-five examples of καλεῖν=*advocare*, and sixteen compounds.

THE HISTORIANS.

There is no better author for the study of the behavior of καλεῖν than Herodotus. The participle meaning "called", "so-called", is regularly present: 1.1 τῆς Ἐρυθρῆς καλεομένης θαλάσσης, 1.2 τὸν Εὔξεινον καλεόμενον, 1.7; 1.56; 1.57 τοῖσι νῦν Θεσσαλιῆτιν καλεομένην, 1.82; 144, 149 Κύμη, ἡ Φρικωνὶς καλεομένη, 166, 202 ἡ Ἀτλαντὶς καλεομένη, 204; 2.8 ἐς τὴς Ἐρυθρὴν καλεομένην θάλασσαν, 7.231 ὁ τρέσας Ἀριστόδημος καλεόμενος, 8.35 τὸν καλεόμενον τοῦτον Μῦν, 8.44 τὴν νῦν καλεομένην Ἑλλάδα, 9.57, 85, 109. So with the present indicative: 1.93, 105, 110, 131 καλέουσι δὲ Ἀσσύριοι τὴν Ἀφροδίτην Μύλιττα, Ἀράβιοι δὲ Ἀλιλάτ, 139 τὸ Δωριέες μὲν σὰν καλέουσι, Ἴωνες δὲ σίγμα, 131, 158, 164, 167 ἥτις νῦν Ὑέλη καλεῖται.

The perfect form κέκλημαι occurs ten times: 1.32 ὄλβιος κεκλῆσθαι, 143 Ἴωνες κεκλῆσθαι, 2.18 Κανωβικὸν στόμα κέκληται, 45 κεκλῆσθαι τὴν Ἀσίην . . . κεκλῆσθαι Ἀσιάδα, 85 Βόσπορος κέκληται, 58 Φοινικήια κεκλῆσθαι, 68 κεκλῆσθαι Αἰγιαλέας, 105 Σαρδονικὸν κέκληται, 7.59 Δορίσκος κέκληται. In every instance, except one, a proper name is the predicate (as Kypris in *Hippolytus* 2), and this one does not mean "to be happily called", but "to be called happy". ἐπικαλεῖν is used mostly in the sense of *invocare*, but occasionally in the sense of ἐπονομάζειν.

In Thucydides κέκλημαι occurs four times: 2.37 δημοκρατία κέκληται, 3.82.7 δεξιοὶ κέκληνται, 4.64.3 ὄνομα ἓν κεκλημένους Σικελιώτας (the only example of the perfect participle in Thucydides, whereas καλούμενος occurs 44 times). In the sense of *advocare* καλεῖν appears twice; the present indicative active occurs twice; the passive eleven times; the aorist passive five times.

In Xenophon κέκλημαι is found four times, all in the *Oeconomicus* and all in the same phrase (καλὸς κἀγαθὸς κέκλημαι). There are twenty-one examples of the participle, all present. There is a score of present passives, a dozen actives, and about fifty examples of καλεῖν = *advocare*. ἐπικαλεῖν is used for ἐπονομάζειν (*Hiero* 1.31; *Hell.* 3.1.18). The aorist passive is rare.

PLATO.

Plato furnishes almost as good material as Herodotus for the study of the use of καλεῖν and κεκλῆσθαι. The perfect is found twenty-one times, mostly with predicate substantives: *Phaedrus* 258 E δικαίων ἀνδραποδώδεις κέκληνται, *Phaedo* 79 D φρόνησις κέκληται, *Legg.* 744 D ὃ διάστασιν ἢ στάσιν ὀρθότερον ἂν εἴη κεκλῆσθαι, *Timaeus* 43 C αἳ δὴ καὶ ἔπειτα ταῦτα ἐκλήθησαν τε καὶ νῦν ἔτι αἰσθήσεις κέκληνται, 66 C κέκληται γλυκύ, *Laches* 178 A ἀρετὴ κέκληται, *Cratylus* 410 B ἀὴρ κέκληται, 417 A κεκλῆσθαι, 419 D τέρψις κέκληται, 420 B ἔρσος τό γε παλαιὸν ἐκαλεῖτο . . . νῦν δ' ἔρως κέκληται, 426 C κίνησις κέκληται, *Rep.* 371 E κέκληνται μισθωτοί, 552 D ὅσοι κέκληνται κακοῦργοι, *Sophistes* 219 E τριοδοντία τις κέκληται, 263 E κέκληται λόγος, *Timaeus* 42 A κεκλήσοιτο ἀνήρ.

The perfect participle occurs six times: *Rep.* 499 B ἀχρήστοις δὲ νῦν κεκλημένοις. *Crat.* 156 B φόβοι κεκλημέναι 408 B, 409 C, 419 C. Two are found also in the scholia to the *Phaedrus* (238 B and 248 C). The active, mostly present (*nominare*) occurs nearly two hundred times, the passive about one-fourth as often.

Some writers prefer one synonym, others another: προσαγορεύειν, ὀνομάζειν, καλεῖν. Plato has all, and, except in a few dialogues (*Sophistes*, *Politicus*), where there is a run on the προσαγορεύειν bank, they are not unevenly distributed. ὀνομάζειν occurs less than a hundred times, ἐπονομάζειν less than fifty. Neither the simple nor the compound forms of ὀνομάζειν and καλεῖν occur frequently in the perfect active. The passive, on the other hand, is not rare. ἐπικαλεῖσθαι is sometimes used for ἐπονομάζεσθαι. As we should expect from his fondness for ποικι-

λία, Plato has a great variety of ways of expressing *to name;* προσαγορεύειν (a hundred times), ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχειν, τὸ ὄνομα ἐπικεῖσθαι ὄνομα ἐκλήθη, ἐπίκλην ἔχοντα, ἐπίκλην καλούμενος, ἐπίκλην λεχθῆναι, ἐπικαλούμενος. The participle ("so-called") occurs sixteen times, and always in the present.

THE ORATORS.

The perfect of καλεῖν does not appear in the orators, except in the participle passive (Lysias *Fr.* 66 ἐπὶ τὸ σύνδειπνον κεκλημένον) and in the indicative active=*advocavit* (Demosthenes 27.25 and 39.10 πότερον σε κέκληκεν). The present participle passive is frequent. The verb is used by the orators nearly three hundred times.

An examination of these examples shows that πολλὴ κέκλημαι cannot mean πολύ μοι κλέος ἐστίν. An examination of the trimeters demonstrates, I think, the same fact in another way. A pause made in the wrong place in a sentence may completely change the meaning. Aristotle says (*Rhet.* 3.9. 4): δεῖ δὲ τὴν περίοδον καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ τετελειῶσθαι, καὶ μὴ διακόπτεσθαι ὥσπερ τὰ Σοφοκλέους ἰαμβεῖα, 'Καλυδὼν μὲν ἥδε γαῖα Πελοπείας χθονός.' If a pause is made at χθονός, the thought is conveyed that Calydon is in the Peloponnesus; but if the next verse be read as a continuation of the first, the sense is clear (ἐν ἀντιπόρθμοις πεδί' ἔχουσ' εὐδαίμονα). Euripides is exonerated and Aristotle is convicted of two misstatements (the verses are the opening lines of the *Meleager* of Euripides). But Aristotle is not the only Greak reader that has been caught in the fallacy of division. Editions of the *Hippolytus* alone for the last century will furnish abundant examples (*e. g.* 114f., 407 etc.).* Euripides did not intend that the verses we are discussing should be read πολλὴ μὲν ἐν βροτοῖσι κοὐκ ἀνώνυμος θεά—κέκλημαι—Κύπρις—οὐρανοῦ τ' ἔσω, nor θεὰ κέκλημαι—Κύπρις—οὐρανοῦ τ' ἔσῳ,

*So the English "devil" who made the poet say "where the earth sods my beloved hide", by neglecting to insert a hyphen between the first two substantives.

for this would have been too limping even for Hipponax. Euripides endeavored to keep his trimeters as intact as possible (each verse separate and distinct), and by so doing he succeeded in attaining wonderful rapidity and ease, that well-known smoothness of speech and uniform melody of verse. He not only avoided a pause before the last iambus (far more than his editors), but he also objected to the continuance of the sentence to the middle of the first metron in the next verse, which was not offensive to Aeschylus and Sophocles (particularly the latter, who effaced the dividing line between the individual verses, carrying his principle even to the point of elision). But when one gets an idea that a certain passage has a certain meaning, it is very difficult to get rid of that idea. Ludwig Schmidt, in his edition of the *Prometheus*, says on verse 119: "Der modus von ὁρᾶτε ist nach v. 141 u. 304 zu beurtheilen". The same consideration has doubtless influenced the long line of editors who take the same view.* Schoemann translates τί χαλᾷ

* Humphrey's note on Sophocles' *Antigone* 806 (that ὁρᾶτε is imper.) fell under my eye just too late to notice in my paper in the last number of the Transactions of the American Philological Association. The very fact that a note is necessary shows the doubt that lurks in the reader's mind whether it is imperative (which it may be under the circumstances) or the indicative (=ὁρᾶν πάρεστιν in 1293). At all events, ὁρᾶτε as imperative of actual perception is practically never used; the one or two supposed examples are by no means certain. If the verb in *O. T.* 15 were plural, doubtless many grammarians would consider it imperative. I take this opportunity to explain another statement in the same paper, that σκοπεῖτε is rare, σκέψαι unusual, σκόπει and σκέψασθε being the regular forms. This assertion is made in the paragraph on the orators. I do not, of course, include that pink of perfection, Isocrates, who is so faultily faultless and icily regular that he uses σκέψαι to correspond with σκέψασθε. In Aeschines σκέψασθε occurs ten times, σκοπεῖτε not at all. Lysias employs σκόπει once, σκέψασθε fourteen times, σκέψαι and σκοπεῖτε never. In Demosthenes σκέψασθε occurs fifty-nine times, σκοπεῖτε only eight, σκόπει six and σκέψαι not at all.

The indicative in Luke 2.29 νῦν ἀπολύεις τὸν δοῦλον σου is generally quoted as an imperative, due, perhaps, to *Genesis* 41.30: "And Israel said unto Joseph, now let me die, since I have seen thy face". So the Latin version: *dimitte servum tuum*, instead of *dimittis*.

μανιῶν; (Aesch. *Prom.* 1057) by "wie zaehmt er die Wuth?". Another scholar renders "wie vergaess' er die Wuth?". Mahaffy and Bury and Weil explain σὺν θεοῖσι φοιτᾷ (*Hippolytus* 167) by "she walks in the number of the gods". Paley translates "thanks to the gods". Van Herwerden surmises that Euripides wrote ἐν θεοῖσι, instead of σὺν θεοῖσι, showing that his conception of the meaning is equally erroneous. Some believe that Hippolytus 246 refers to change of color (cp. *Ion* 1369 f.). Scores of examples like these might be cited to show how well the language of the tragic poets is understood by eminent scholars.

Sanskrit is an analyzable language in word structure, Greek in sentence structure. But the Greek sentence sometimes betrays extra-linguistic phenomena. The Hellenic liveliness overleaps rules that were framed for normal conditions. "Natural man manipulates language sensitively and fruitfully without the interference that comes from critical understanding of the processes of word-making."* A little tot says "me no get for you" and "me how know do that". There is no analysis; the sounds are all there; the transposition (for-get) mattered little to the unanalytic mind. Compare Plato, *Protag.* 324 A πρὸς τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων. The Greeks, like children, manipulated language naturally. They could say οἶσθ ὃ δρᾶσον with the same unhesitancy as the American girl would say "I tell you, girls, what lets do". Such a lively language can produce not only the familiar τὰ ἡμέτερ' αὐτῶν, but also ἡμέτερα κέρδη τῶν σοφῶν (Ar. *Nub.* 1202). In the hands of a self-willed writer, like Aeschylus, it pays little heed to regimen. The manipulator seizes a ῥῆμα ἀμαξιαῖον and throws it into its place at the head of the sentence regardless of case. Analysis will not show how Pindar built his odes; analysis will not always show how Euripides con-

* Bloomfield, *The Symbolic Gods*, Studies in Honor of B. L. Gildersleeve, p. 143.

structed his trimeters. The conception gained from a felicitous translation into one's "geliebtes Deutsch", or "geliebtes Englisch" is not necessarily the Greek conception. A happy paraphrase in Greek itself is not always an infallible guide. Neither Weil's nor Earle's Greek equivalent of *Hippolytus* 1–2 connote the Greek idea. Much nearer the truth is Monk, who renders "I am powerful" (κέκλημαι=εἰμί). But he does not give the whole truth. ὁ πᾶσι κλεινὸς Οἰδίπους καλούμενος does not mean exactly "I, Oedipus renowned of all" (Jebb), nor "I, who am of all called renowned Oedipus". In both the *Hippolytus* and the *Oedipus* the words are knit together with a closeness of which the English has no conception. In the passage under discussion κέκλημαι dovetails into πολλὴ . . . Κύπρις. Call it a temporary compound, if you will, or conceive the adjectives πολλὴ . . . κοὐκ ἀνώνυμος as trailing after κέκλημαι Κύπρις, the effect is practically the same. It is only an extension of a phenomenon familiar in smaller complexes, like μικρὸν ἔχων χιτῶνα, where ἔχων is mortised into the adjective-substantive phrase. We undertranslate or overtranslate. Greek is too flexible to be bound by rules, mirrors too well the living voice to assume cast-iron Latin rigidity. As Weil himself says (*Journal des Savants*, May 1901): "la langue grecque, produit naturel d' un peuple admirablement doué, n' a pas connu pendant des siècles le joug étroit des grammairiens de profession ; instrument d' une merveilleuse souplesse, elle s' accommoda au caractère des genres littéraires, au génie des poètes, des orateurs, des écrivains qui savaient en jouer, capable de rendre les plus fines nuances du sentiment et de la pensée. Mobile et variée a l' infini, tout en restant la même, cette langue fait, par son apparente indiscipline, le désespoir des grammairiens rigides et les délices des esprits qui savent la gouter". As Professor Gildersleeve says: "The rules will not work ; the facts will not fit into the scheme ; analysis will not yield synthesis". Many scholars think that τίς is in the predicate in *Hippolytus* 369. It is a part

of the complex subject. The few examples of τίς in the predicate without ὤν that *do* occur (as Sophocles, *O. T.* 151) are entirely different in nature. To the Greek the juxtaposition of τίς with σέ is sufficient to justify his conceiving the words as subject and object respectively. The love of balance, of contrast, must never be left out of account in the consideration of a Greek language-problem. Only a casual plance at the tragic poets is necessary to convince one that the Greeks refused to separate subject and object, if one of the *promessi sposi* happened to be τίς (ὅστις) and the other μέ, σέ, αὐτόν. There can be a ὅδε τίς χρόνος as well as a ὅδε μακρὸς χρόνος. The words coalesce temporarily, as καλοκἀγαθός has permanently. Compare the Aristophanic τὸ τί, τὸ ποῖον, the Sophoclean and Aeschylean τί δ' ὄντινα. As in hypallage, the words are put together compactly so as to form a unit. The individual word is subordinated to the group. The power of the stream of thought unifies and welds the individual elements into one harmonious whole. A language that can form such phrases as ὦ πάντα σὺ τολμῶν (*Ar. Nub.* 375), ὦ καλλίπυργον σοφίαν κλεινοτάτην ἐπασκῶν (1024) ὦ κοινὸν ὠφέλημα θνητοῖσιν φανείς (Aesch. *Prom.* 613), πλήθους μὲν ἂν σάφ' ἴσθ' ἕκατι (*Pers.* 337), τοῦ παρακρούσασθαι καὶ φενακίσαι λέγεται παρ' ἡμῶν εἵνεκα (Dem. 20.88) will experience no difficulty in making a rhetorical complex like πολλὴ κοὐκ ἀνώνυμος θεὰ κέκλημαι Κύπρις.

If our philologians and comparative grammarians could be induced to forego their Promethean proclivities occasionally and would resolve to adopt the discredited Epimethean methods, they would learn more about the Indo-European family ot languages than any bare record of morphological changes in quarto volumes can possibly impart. Language is not simply an algebraic symbol or combination of symbols, to convey ideas; it is not a mere mechanism, nor yet a work of nature, but, as Brunetière says, it is also a work of art. A knowledge of the individual is not gained by a study of his physical growth. As Goethe

says, you cannot argue from any characteristics which a boy may have exactly what kind of a man he will prove; but if you take the other point of view and look backward from manhood toward youth, you can readily see how the man grew out of such a lad. So with nations. Looking backward has its advantages in language study as well as in economics. The genius of a people, as mirrored in their speech can thus be discerned, and the language-transformations better understood. With the Roman each word is an entity, is gravely weighed, meant (cp. Serv. *Aen.* 6.724 Romanos graves, Gallos natura feroces atque acriores ingenio); with the Gaul (speaking generally, and without reference to the psychological fact that we talk in phrases) no word is an entity, weighed, or meant, outside of its belongings. In Latin the word is the unit, is a sturdy independent Roman soldier; in French the only unity is the group, the society—the words flock together and solidify. The Italian retains some of the Roman characteristics. He puts his strength in the individual word, even bolsters it up, if there is danger of a vowel or consonantal break-down, by doubling or lengthening. In *non volete venire con me* the words, whether in the group or out of it, are the same. Not so the French. Wrenched from their place, torn from their environment, they change their εἴδη as the chameleon his colors. Hence the confusion in the mind of the learner, taught, it may be, two diametrically opposed theories with regard to French accent, or a rule, beautiful in theory, which he discovers he can never put into practice. The Gaul had from time immemorial fighting ability and *esprit.* Gallia duas res industriosissime persequitur: *rem militarem et argute loqui* (Cato. ap. *Charis.*) The French language is a living proof of the latter part of this statement. The Frenchman wants to communicate and to be communicated unto. Hence he has, in the lapse of centuries, created and perfected an instrument admirably adapted for that purpose. He wants to convey his concept as

a concept, in concentrated form, without taking the time and the trouble of reducing it to analysis—he gives the thought in a thought-word, and indicates the end of the word-group by voice-stress. In his language the Frenchman reveals the characteristics Cæsar observed: enthusiastic, impulsive, quick-witted, versatile, inquisitive (cp. B. G. 2.1.3; 3.9.6; 4.5.2; 7.20). The Spaniard, again, betrays his cavalier proclivities by his speech. His abruptness and impetuousity are reflected in his diphthongs. In *fuerte* we can see the rapier thrust; in *forte, tremolare* the Italian predilection for dwelling on the melodious sounds, to talk for the sound of it; in *fort* the desire for quick communication—no Spanish superfluous expenditure of energy. As Galdós says (*Cádiz* 14): "*España es el país de naturaleza desnuda, de las pasiones exaltadas, de los sentimientos enérgicos . . . de los privilegios que traen las luchas de la guerra continua del nunca descansar.*" George Sand (*Le Marquis de Villemer* ch. 18) speaks of "*Cette pose trop belle et un peu théatrâle qui caractérise la race espagnole.*" Now the Greek had the rapidity and energy of the Spanish, but exercised a sober self-control; had the power of the French to merge single words into a thought-complex, but possessed greater elasticity. The synthetic language here shows its superiority over the analytic. The words do not lose their individuality to the same degree. There is, to be sure, a complete destruction of the word in the case of elision (whereas Latin word-tenacity made for word-survival, real elision being unknown); nevertheless, the single words in a Greek sentence retain their original accent. The first two verses of the *Hippolytus* have the French compactness, but the words cling together in the group without spasmodic effort.

While πολύ μοι κλέος ἐστί is possible Greek, I have not been able to find a parallel. The comparative (πλεῖον) occurs in Hesiod, *Theog.* 531. The common phrases are: κλέος ἐσθλόν,

μέγα κλέος, κλέος ἄφθιτον, ἀειμνηστον, εὐρύ, ἄσβεστον, ἀέναον, βαθύ, οὐρανῷ στηρίζον. πολύκλειτον, Pind. *O.* 6.71 (120) is very different from πολὺ κεκλημένον. Even Aristophanes, *Lys.* 853ff. (οὐ γὰρ ἀκλεὲς τοὔνομα | τὸ σὸν παρ' ἡμῖν ἐστιν οὐδ' ἀνώνυμον), proves nothing, except, perhaps, how little the derivation of the word ἀνώνυμος was felt. We can say τοὔνομά ἐστιν ἀνώνυμον, but not κέκλημαι ἀνώνυμος (in this sense at least), nor κέκλημαι ἀκλεής. Cp. Plato, *Theages* 123 C for a different meaning. The usual signification of ἀνώνυμος is *inglorious*, as in Plato, *Legg* 721 B κλεινὸν καὶ μὴ ἀνώνυμον. Cp. Hdt. 7.129. In Plato's *Theaetetus* 126 B we have ἀνώνυμος and κέκλημαι in the same sentence, as here, but the context shows that ἀνώνυμος is used for the sake of variety, merely as a negative of κεκλημένος (αἱ μὲν αἰσθήσεις τὰ τοιάδε ἡμῖν ἔχουσιν ὀνόματα . . . καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ φόβοι κεκλημέναι καὶ ἄλλαι ἀπέραντοι μὲν αἱ ἀνώνυμοι, παμπληθεῖς δὲ αἱ ὠνομασμέναι). Indeed, the whole trouble seems to have arisen from the accidental circumstance that ἀνώνυμος bears a certain synonymical relation to κέκλημαι. In this sentence ἀνώνυμος has no more to do with κέκλημαι than πολλή. The thought is simply: "I am a goddess, powerful and far-famed; my name is Kypris".*

A rather remarkable testimony to the fact that Greeks of the early centuries of our era (if, indeed, the lines were written then) considered πολλή separate and apart from κέκλημαι, is a verse in the play on the passion of Christ, quoted almost verbatim from the *Hippolytus*:

> πολλὴ μὲν ἐν βροτοῖσιν κοὐκ ἀνώνυμος
> ἀγνὴ κεκλήσει τῆσδε γῆς.

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* How easily πολύς and μέγας could be interchanged is shown by such examples as Soph. *adesp.* 157 πολλὴ φαρέτρα, Hdt. 6.24 ἡ δέ σφι πολλὴ . . . ὀρύσσεται, [Dem.] 59.99 ὁ γὰρ Ἀσωπὸς ποταμὸς μέγας ἐρρύη καὶ διαβῆναι οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἦν. Cp. also the Herodotean μεγάλα χρήματα.

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